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CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
THE INVESTIGATIVE STOP: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN WE RUN?
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000)
"The wicked flee, when no man pursueth, but the righteous
are bold as a lion."l
I.

FACTS
Around noon 2 on September 9, 1995, Sam Wardlow was standing
on a Chicago street holding a white, opaque bag when he noticed a
police caravan patrolling the area.3 The police patrolled this area, known
for its high drug trafficking, to investigate drug transactions. 4 Upon
5
seeing the caravan, Wardlow took flight on foot away from the vehicles.
Two uniformed officers in the last police vehicle intercepted Wardlow,
cutting off his escape route. 6 One of the officers then conducted a stop
and frisk of Wardlow. 7 During the frisk, the police officer discovered
that the white bag contained a handgun with live ammunition, for which
the officer arrested Wardlow. 8
Although the police officers probably did not have an identified
location as their destination, 9 the predominately minority areal 0 where
they confronted Wardlow had a history of criminal activity. II In 1997
this district, District Eleven, had the highest number of murders and
1. Proverbs 28:1. The court in Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 511 (1896), refuted the
argument that this quote is an accepted axiom of criminal law.
2. See People v. Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d 65, 66 (II1.App. Ct. 1997) (indicating that the time of the
arrest was at 12:15 p.m.).
3. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 121-22 (2000) (observing Wardlow standing next to a
building and looking in the direction of the officers in the caravan).
4. Id. at 121.
5. Id. at 122.
6. Id. The two uniformed officers, Nolan and Harvey, observed Wardlow run down a nearby
alley. Id. The officers cornered Wardlow with their vehicle, and Officer Nolan exited the vehicle
and detained Wardlow. Id.
7. Id. Officer Nolan conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons. Id.
8. Id. During the search, Officer Nolan felt a hard object in the bag that resembled a gun. Id.
Officer Nolan opened the bag and found a .38 caliber handgun with five live rounds of ammunition.
Id.
9. See id. at 137 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d 65, 67 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1997) ("[I]t appears that the officers were simply driving by, on their way to some unidentified
location .... )).
10. See Brief of the National Association of Police Organizations at 1-31, Wardlow (No. 981036) (referring frequently to the district as a predominantly minority area). The district's population
in 1990 consisted of 3,167 whites; 91,099 blacks; 319 Asians; 132 Native Americans; and 3,387 other.
Id. at 31 app. 2.
11. See id. at 7, 30 app. 1 (providing a breakdown of the major crimes in each of the Chicago
districts in 1997).
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robberies and the second highest number of criminal sexual assaults and
aggravated assaults out of all the twenty-five Chicago districts. 12
At the Illinois trial court level, the court denied Wardlow's request
for a motion to suppress the evidence' 3 discovered during the investigative stop and frisk and convicted Wardlow of the unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. 14 Wardlow appealed his conviction to the Illinois Appellate Court. 15 He claimed that the trial court should have suppressed the
evidence collected during the stop and frisk because his unprovoked
flight did not create a reasonable suspicion of a crime needed under
Terry v. Ohiol6 to justify an investigative stop. 17 The Illinois Appellate
Court agreed and reversed Wardlow's conviction on the grounds that the
investigative stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights. 18
The state appealed the case to the Illinois Supreme Court, which
affirmed the decision of the Illinois Appellate Court. 19 The Illinois
Supreme Court reasoned that unprovoked flight, in a high crime area, at
the sight of a police officer did not constitute a reasonable suspicion that
the individual was going to commit or had committed a crime. 2 0 The
court stated that a person has no obligation to respond to police questioning in the absence of reasonable suspicion of a crime and that a
person has a right to go on his way-even at a run. 2 1 Since the police
did not have a reasonable suspicion that Wardlow had committed or was
about to commit a crime, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the
investigative stop violated Wardlow's Fourth Amendment rights against
unlawful searches and seizures. 22
12. Id.
13. See Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d at 66 (referring to the handgun and bullets).
14. Id. Following a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, the court sentenced
Wardlow to two years in prison. Id.
15. Id.
16. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
17. See Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d at 66-67 (applying the objective Terry standard used to evaluate
the lawfulness of police detentions of suspicious persons); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
(establishing the reasonable suspicion requirement for a brief investigative stop of an individual by a
police officer).
18. See Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d at 68 (concluding that Wardlow was not in a high crime area and
that flight alone can not satisfy an investigative stop).
19. See People v. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d 484, 489 (Il1. 1998) (finding that the appellate court
properly reversed the trial court's denial of Wardlow's motion to suppress evidence).
20. See id. at 487 (agreeing with the majority of courts that unequivocal flight of a suspect upon
seeing the police does not by itself establish reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct an investigative
stop of the individual).
21. See id. (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983) (determining that a person can
simply refuse to answer police questions and continue on his or her way in the absence of reasonable
grounds for temporarily stopping the person)).
22. See id. at 489 (finding that the trial court should have suppressed the handgun as the "product
of the unconstitutional seizure of [Wardlow]").
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After the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling, the state appealed
decision, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 2 3
United States Supreme Court held that Wardlow's unprovoked flight
high crime area did satisfy the reasonable suspicion requirement
24
reversed the Illinois Supreme Court's decision.
II.

the
The
in a
and

LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
25
things to be seized.
It protects the general public against unnecessary government
intrusion into their daily lives. 2 6 Prior to 1968, police officers had to
meet the Fourth Amendment's probable cause standard 27 before detaining an individual. 2 8 In 1968, a Supreme Court interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment justified a police officer's temporary detainment of
2 9 This
an individual based on a lower reasonable suspicion standard.
interpretation would leave the Supreme Court and the lower courts with
the task of trying to determine what circumstances or set of factors
would satisfy the new reasonable suspicion standard. 3 0
Flight is an important factor in Fourth Amendment analysis because
many citizens automatically associate flight with a presumption of
guilt. 3 1 Several courts, however, have taken a contrary view. 32 Also, citi23. Illinois v. Wardlow, 526 U.S. 1097 (1999) (mem.) (granting certiorari).
24. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125-26 (2000).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
26. See id. (allowing only reasonable searches and seizures).
27. Infra Part II.B (defining the probable cause standard).
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring probable cause for searches and seizures); see also
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
29. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-23; see also infra Part 1.B (defining the reasonable suspicion standard).
30. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.
[T]he Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point
the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular
search or seizure in light of the particular circumstance.
Id.
31. See Brief for Petitioner at 8, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (No. 98-1036) (summarizing the common sense approach to flight that most citizens do not flee at the sight of an officer
and that fleeing constitutes a suspicious behavior warranting an investigation).
32. See People v. Wilson, 784 P.2d 325, 326-27 (Colo. 1989) (finding defendant's flight insufficient to create reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop); see also People v. Shabaz, 378 N.W.2d
451, 460 (Mich. 1985) (finding flight of a surveillance subject insufficient to justify an investigative
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zens may perceive that Fourth Amendment procedures typically protect
the guilty, which clouds their understanding of the amendment's
ultimate goal of protecting all citizens against intrusive government
actions.33
This section will discuss the case law development of the investigative stop, the different types of police-citizen encounters, perceptions of
flight, and lower court applications of previous Supreme Court Fourth
Amendment decisions, which created the basis for the Wardlow opinion.
A. THE TERRY STOP
In Terry v. Ohio, a police officer conducted an investigative stop
and frisk of petitioner Terry. 3 4 The officer had witnessed Terry and another man making several trips in front of a store window, which raised
the officer's suspicion of a possible planned robbery by Terry and two
other men. 35 After about ten to twelve minutes of the ritual, the officer
approached the men, identified himself, and asked for their names. 36
When the men only mumbled some response, the officer spun Terry
around and conducted a protective pat down. 37 During the pat down, the
officer found a weapon on Terry and arrested him for carrying a
concealed weapon. 38
At trial, Terry moved to suppress the weapon as evidence, claiming
that the officer had conducted an unlawful investigative stop and frisk,
because the officer lacked probable cause. 39 The United States Supreme
Court, on appeal, upheld Terry's conviction 40 and determined that an investigative stop was Fourth Amendment activity. 4 1 The Court then decided what level of suspicion an officer had to possess in order to lawfully
conduct such a stop.42 The Court concluded that in certain circumstances a police officer, without probable cause, could stop an individual and
conduct a protective search for weapons without violating the individustop).
33. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 290 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Because the strongest
advocates of Fourth Amendment rights are frequently criminals, it is easy to forget that our
interpretations of such rights apply to the innocent and guilty alike. Id.
34. Terry, 392 U.S. at 6-7.
35. See id. at 5-6 (describing how Officer McFadden watched the men make five to six trips
each in front of the store and then briefly converse with another man).
36. See id. at 6-7 (describing that at this point in the encounter, Officer McFadden acted solely
on what he had observed and had no other independent knowledge of any criminal activity).
37. Id.at 7.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 7-8 (stating that the trial court denied Terry's motion to suppress evidence, which
he appealed).
40. Id. at 30-31.
41. See id. at 16-17 (determining that the Fourth Amendment applies to an officer's temporary
stop of an individual because the officer has restrained the citizen's liberty).
42. See id. at 20-21 (examining the reasonableness of an officer's action in light of his or her
observations on the beat).
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43
al's Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful searches and seizures.
The Court clearly stated, however, that the police officer must have specific and articulable facts, coupled with a reasonable inference of criminal
44
activity, in order to justify the investigative stop.
Further, the Court determined that future courts should use an objective standard to assess whether an officer conducted a lawful stop. 45 The
objective standard required the fact finder to determine what a reasonable and prudent person would have concluded about the observed
individual given the particular circumstances. 4 6 This standard eliminated
mere suspicions or hunches as justifiable reasons for conducting an
47
investigative stop.

Following Terry, the Supreme Court continued to define what police
actions fell into the exception to the Fourth Amendment probable cause
standard that Terry provided. 4 8 For example, the Court found that a
police officer could approach a vehicle and remove a weapon from the
driver's waistband based solely on an informant's tip. 49 These circumstances satisfied the reasonable suspicion standard because the informant
had provided the officer with reliable information in the past, and the
officer could have arrested the informant for a false complaint. 50
In contrast, the Court determined that border police could not stop
vehicles to check for illegal aliens because the passengers looked like
Mexicans. 5 1 The Court concluded that the officer's reliance on one
single factor-the apparent Mexican ancestry of the occupants-did not
suffice to establish reasonable suspicion of illegal aliens. 52
43. Id. at 30.
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads
him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot
and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous...
he is entitled to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
Id.
44. See id. at 21 (setting the requirements for an investigative stop).
45. See id. at 21-22 (referring to whether a man of reasonable caution would find the stop
justified).
46. Id.
47. See id. at 22 (requiring something more than inarticulate hunches for a stop); see also id. at
27 (stating that inchoate or unparticularized suspicion or hunch is not enough to determine whether an
officer acted with reasonable suspicion).
48. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 493,499 (1983) (utilizing the Terry analysis to determine
whether police illegally detained an individual based on a drug courier profile); see also Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1979) (holding that the Fourth Amendment, in light of Terry, does not allow
officers to stop a person and demand his identification without more information to support the
individual's participation in criminal activity).
49. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (rejecting the argument that an officer can
only justify a stop and frisk through his own personal observation).
50. Id. at 146-47.
51. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 874-76, 886 (1975).
52. See id. at 886 (finding appearance alone not a sufficient reason to detain an individual).
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In Brown v. Texas, 53 a unanimous Court held that a police officer
could not stop and frisk an individual walking in a known drug area or
request his identification without connecting that individual with involvement in a particular crime. 54 The Court reasoned that the police lacked
reasonable grounds for the stop because Brown's acts did not differ
from those of any other member of the neighborhood. 55 Brown made
location alone an insufficient basis for an investigative stop. 56
As a result of its varying opinions, the Court realized that the
process of finding reasonable suspicion would never "deal with hard
certainties," but instead "with probabilities." 57 The Court determined
that the proper way to deal with these various probabilities involving
police investigative stops was to apply the totality-of-the-circumstances
approach. 58 This approach required courts to look at the whole picture,
the particular circumstances of each case, to determine if the detaining
police officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative
stop. 59 The Court decided to adopt this approach because terms such as
"founded suspicion" and "articulable reasons," used by lower courts
to determine the lawfulness of an investigative stop, did not provide sufficient clarity and guidance to address all of the possible factual situations
60
that could arise.
These opinions also led to the development of four distinct categories of the investigative stop and frisk. 6 1 These areas, two involving the
stop and two involving the frisk, create generic questions used by courts
to analyze whether a police officer properly conducted a stop and frisk:
(1) whether there was even a stop, which required defining "stop" and
"seizure" under the Fourth Amendment, (2) whether the stop/seizure
was reasonable (justified), (3) whether a frisk could take place, and (4)
whether the scope of the frisk was proper. 62 As a result, the investigative
stop and the protective pat down for weapons have emerged as separate
entities, each requiring its own Fourth Amendment analysis. 63
53. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
54. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 48-50 (1979).
55. Id. at 52.
56. See id. ("The fact that appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing
alone, [was] not a basis for concluding that appellant himself was engaged in criminal conduct.").
57. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,412-16, 418 (1981).
58. Id. at 417.
59. Id. at 417-18.
60. Id. at 417.
61. See CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF
CASES AND CONCEPTS § 11.01, at 237 (4th ed. 2000) (describing the four distinct issues that Terry raised).
62. Id.
63. See United States v. Davis, 202 F.3d 1060, 1062 (8th Cir. 2000) (clarifying the differences between an investigative stop and a frisk in a case involving a Minneapolis police officer's consensual
search of an individual).
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THE TIERS OF POLICE-CITIZEN ENCOUNTERS

The reasonable suspicion or "reasonableness test" of Terry created
three tiers or levels of suspicion needed to justify different types of
police-citizen encounters. 64 The three tiers consist of (1) a mere suspicion or hunch, 65 (2) a reasonable, articulable suspicion or "founded
suspicion," 6 6 and (3) probable cause. 67 Based upon a police officer's
different observations, and the inferences the officer can draw from
them, the Fourth Amendment applied different limitations to the officer's interference with a citizen's freedom. 68
A suspicion or hunch permits police questioning of an individual
and is not considered Fourth Amendment activity because the individual
has the right to decline to answer and walk away at any time; thus, no
seizure occurs. 69 For example, a police officer observed an individual
walking in an area known for drug trafficking and prostitution. 70 The
officer confronted the person and asked him questions about what he
was doing, but the individual lawfully chose not to respond and continued on his way. 7 1
In order for an officer to have a reasonable suspicion or founded
suspicion, the officer must have a particularized and objective basis,
supported by specific and articulable facts, for suspecting a person of
criminal activity. 72 This reasonable suspicion tier justifies an investigative (Terry) stop.73 For example, a police officer, experienced in drug
sales, observed two individuals exchanging small objects for money in an
area known for open drug transactions. 7 4 The police officer properly
conducted an investigative stop and temporarily detained the individuals
in order to clarify the officer's suspicion of drug dealing.75
As for the final tier, probable cause requires a "reasonable"
ground to suspect that a person has committed or is committing a crime
64. People v. Shabaz, 378 N.W.2d 451, 457-58 (Mich. 1985).
65. See supra note 47 (defining mere suspicion).
66. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417 (1981) (describing how the various courts use
words such as "articulable reasons" or "founded suspicion" to describe what police officers must
have to conduct a lawful investigative stop).
67. See Shabaz, 378 N.W.2d at 458 (describing the three tiers).
68. Id. at 457-58.
69. Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring); 34 (White, J., concurring)); see
also infra discussion Part II.C.
70. United States v. Gray, 213 F.3d 998, 999-1001 (8th Cir. 2000).
71. Id. at 1001.
72. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (explaining the reasonable suspicion standard).
73. See Shabaz, 378 N.W.2d at 458 (allowing police officers to conduct a temporary stop of an
individual to clarify reasonable police suspicions).
74. Commonwealth v. Valentine, 748 A.2d 711,712 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
75. See id. at 714-15, 712 (finding that officer who observed a drug sale had a reasonable
suspicion to make an investigative stop).
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or that a place contains specific items connected with a crime. 7 6 Probable cause justifies an arrest. 77 For example, a well-trained police officer
observed an individual who displayed drugs to another person and then
placed the drugs in his pocket.78 The police officer legally detained and
arrested the individual for possessing an illegal substance. 79
In brief, reasonable suspicion requires more indications of a crime
than a mere hunch, but still allows an officer to temporarily detain an
individual without probable cause.80 A police officer meets this reasonable suspicion standard in conducting an investigative stop when "a
reasonable person in the officer's position would be justified by some
objective manifestation to suspect potential criminal activity." 8 1 Officers
must rely on their experience and training to analyze the particular
situation and to determine if reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
exists. 82
C.

THE MENDENHALL-ROYER "FREE TO LEAVE" TEST

As the case law emerged, the Court continued to find that police
officers could approach an individual on the street or in a public place
and ask the individual questions without violating his or her Fourth
Amendment rights. 83 The Court also routinely held that the individual
could refuse to answer these questions and simply go on his or her way
unless the police had a reasonable justification for further detaining the
person. 8 4 Professor LaFave, in his treatise, referred to this act as the Mendenhall-Royer "free to leave" test, based upon the respective Supreme
Court decisions.8 5
76. See Shabaz, 378 N.W.2d at 458 (citing Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)
(explaining that probable cause to justify an arrest refers to the facts and circumstances within the
officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in
believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense)).
77. Id.
78. See State v. Beras-Calletano, No. 43863-8-4, 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS 449, at *9-*10 (Mar.
20, 2000) (upholding a drug possession conviction based upon an officer's observation of the
defendant putting drugs in his front pocket in an area known for drug trafficking).
79. Id.
80. State v. Kenner, 1997 ND 1, 8, 559 N.W.2d. 538, 540-41.
81. See State v. Ova, 539 N.W.2d 857, 859 (N.D. 1995) (citing State v. Horaday, 477 N.W.2d
245, 246) (N.D. 1991) (explaining how North Dakota, following the U.S. Supreme Court, utilizes an
objective standard in reviewing an investigative stop).
82. Id.
83. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31, 32-33
(1968) (Harlan, J., concurring); Id. at 34 (White, J., concurring)).
84. See id. (stating that an individual had no legal requirement to stop and answer police questions unless the officer had reasonable, objective grounds for the stop); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at
32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding that a citizen had the right to ignore his interrogator and walk
away unless the police officer had some constitutional grounds to insist upon an encounter).
85. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.3(a) (3d ed. 1996) (explaining the
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In United States v. Mendenhall,86 Drug Enforcement Agents, suspecting illegal drug transportation, approached Mendenhall in an airport
concourse, identified themselves as federal agents, and asked to see her
airline ticket and identification. 8 7 During the course of their questioning, the agents became suspicious of Mendenhall's actions and discovered heroin on her person in a subsequent search. 88 Mendenhall
attempted to have the evidence suppressed, claiming that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment. 89 The Court reasoned that an illegal seizure
would have occurred only if Mendenhall believed that she was not free
to leave.90 It maintained the view that the Fourth Amendment does not
prevent all police-citizen contacts and that a person becomes "seized"
only when the police, by show of authority or physical force, obstruct a
person's liberty. 9 1 Consequently, the Court concluded that the police
did not improperly detain Mendenhall because she had no reason to believe that she could not end the conversation with the agents at any time
92
and continue on her way.
Florida v. Royer involved detectives who approached Royer in an
airport concourse and asked him for his airline ticket and driver's
license, believing that Royer fit a drug courier profile. 9 3 In contrast to
Mendenhall, during routine questioning the detectives told Royer that
they suspected him of narcotic transportation, asked him to accompany
them to a police room, and maintained possession of his airline ticket
and driver's license. 94 The Court found that these circumstances constituted an official show of authority. 95 As a result, the Court determined
that an illegal seizure had occurred because a reasonable person in
Royer's position would not have felt that he or she was free to leave. 96
Justices Marshall, Stevens, and White supported this constitutional
right to leave. 9 7 In subsequent opinions, Justices Marshall and Stevens
argued that a citizen's response to police contact should not govern the
development and effects of the free to leave test based on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
86. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
87. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547-48 (1980).
88. Id. at 548-49.
89. See id. at 549 (explaining that the trial court denied Mendenhall's motion to suppress).
90. Id. at 554.
91. Id. at 553-55.
92. Id. at 555.
93. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 493-94 (1983) (explaining the factors used to determine
if an individual meets a drug courier profile).
94. Id. at 501.
95. Id. at 502.
96. See id. at 503 (affirming the Florida District Court of Appeal's decision that Royer was never
free to board his plane).
97. Royer, 460 U.S. at 493, 496-97. Justice White announced in the majority opinion, joined by
Justices Marshall and Stevens, that an unreasonable seizure had occurred because Royer was never
free to leave. Id. In Mendenhall, Justice White, joined by Justices Stevens and Marshall, argued that
Mendenhall never was free to leave. 466 U.S. at 566-577.
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constitutionality of the officer's conduct.98 They maintained the position that if a citizen did not feel free to leave in a police encounter, the
police must have reasonable suspicion for the detainment. 9 9 Justice
Marshall noted that police officers should only restrict a person's freedom to leave to investigate use "ongoing crimes, to prevent imminent
crimes, and to protect law enforcement officers in highly charged situations" 100 in order to prevent police harassment based only on imprecise
stereotypes.lOl Given these strong arguments for the right to leave test,
some lower courts have concluded that individuals may have the right to
02
avoid police contact-even at top speed.1
D.

STATE COURTS' INTERPRETATION OF FLIGHT

For many courts, flight once provided a clear indication or maybe
even a confession of guilt, especially if the flight occurred after a
crime. 103 If a court treated flight as a conclusive presumption of guilt, a
defendant's flight would likely result in a guilty verdict even if innocent
reasons for the flight existed. 104 Unfortunately, some innocent individuals have fled from the authorities out of emotion such as fear. 105
In contrast, if a court considered flight simply another factual
circumstance, the defendant's flight alone could not lead to a guilty
98. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 645 (1991). Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall,
dissented to the Court's finding of reasonable suspicion because a seizure must be justified by the facts
at the time of the police encounter and not by the individual's subsequent reaction. Id. In Hodari D., a
group of youths, including Hodari, fled at the sight of oncoming police officers. Id. at 622-23. The
officers gave chase, and Hodari discarded some crack cocaine during his flight. Id. at 623. Hodari
moved to have the cocaine suppressed arguing that the officer had seized him without a reasonable
suspicion. Id. The majority reversed the lower court's granting of the motion to suppress, concluding
that the officer had not seized Hodari until after he dropped the cocaine and the officer tackled him.
Id. at 629.
99. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 442 (1991). Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Stevens and
Blackmun, dissented to a majority opinion finding that police officers can conduct sweeps of buses
during which the officers ask the passengers questions in an attempt to identify drug couriers. Id.
Justice Marshall determined that the passengers were in no position to evade the police questioning
and did not have the freedom to leave the bus. Id.
100. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 12 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (citing Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (explaining how the reasonable suspicion standard, as a derivative of
probable cause, should only be used for brief detentions necessitated by law)).
101. Id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 14-15 & n.11).
102. See People v. Shabaz, 378 N.W.2d 451,460 (Mich. 1985) (rationalizing that if an individual
has the constitutional right to go on his or her way, it should not matter at what pace the individual
exercises this right).
103. See Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 510 (1896) (rejecting the common argument or
perception that flight after a crime is a presumption of guilt or a confession).
104. See Hickory v. United States, 160 U.S. 408, 422 (1896) (examining how the legal system
once treated concealment, such as flight, as clear proof of guilt and quoting Proverbs 28:1, that "the
wicked flee, when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as a lion").
105. See Alberty, 162 U.S. at 511 (explaining that some innocent individuals flee from the scene
of a crime out of fear of being detained as suspects, to avoid being a witness, or having to clear their
own name).
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verdict, and the trier of fact would have to consider it along with other
evidence.1 06 A court could simply allow the jury to reach its own inferences from the flight or give the jurors an inference instruction about the
flight. 107
The Supreme Court rectified this problem and concluded that flight
did not create a presumption of guilt; however, this still left the Court
and the lower courts to determine how much emphasis to put on flight as
an indicator of criminal activity.' 0 8 For example, in Sibron v. New
York,1 0 9 the Supreme Court labeled flight as a strong indication of mens
rea.ll 0
Consequently, the state courts have disagreed on whether flight
alone warranted reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop.11
For example, California, 112 Colorado,11 3 Georgia,14 Michigan,11 5 Nebraska,"l 6 and New Jersey"l 7 have held that police officers cannot
question individuals solely due to the individuals' flight from police,
because flight alone did not create reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity. Indiana, 118 Minnesota, 119 Ohio,120 and Wisconsin, 121 in comparison, have found that flight alone justified an investigative stop because
106. See Hickory, 160 U.S. at 420-21 (rationalizing that flight after a crime is only a factual circumstance that the trier of fact must consider along with the other evidence to determine an individual's guilt, and it is not an automatic legal presumption of guilt); see also Alberty, 162 U.S. at 511
("[lit certainly would not be contended as a universal rule that the fact that a person, who chanced to
be present on the scene of a murder, shortly thereafter left the city, would, in the absence of all other
testimony, be sufficient in itself to justify his conviction of the murder.").
107. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EvIDENCE UNDER THE RULES 775
(2000) (defining a presumption in fact); see also id. at 77 & n.5 (describing the potential difficulties of
inviting the jury to consider flight as evidence of possible guilt).
108. See Hickory, 160 U.S. at 416-17 (finding that acts of concealment, such as flight, are not
conclusive indications of guilt but are mere circumstances that courts must consider and weigh in
conjunction with other evidence with the "caution and circumspection which their inconclusiveness
when standing alone require").
109. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
110. Id. at 66-67.
111. See Iver Peterson, States Are Split on Whether Flight is Reason Enoughfor a Search, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2000, at A29 (listing states that do and do not find flight sufficient for an investigative
stop).
112. See, e.g., People v. Souza, 885 P.2d 982, 983 (Cal. 1994) (declining to establish a bright-line
rule that flight, without more, justifies an investigative stop).
113. People v. Wilson, 784 P.2d 325, 327 (Colo. 1989).
114. See Harris v. State, 423 S.E.2d 723, 724-25 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (determining that flight in a
high crime area is sufficient for a stop).
115. People v. Shabaz, 378 N.W.2d 451, 460 (Mich. 1985).
116. See State v. Hicks, 488 N.W.2d 359, 364 (Neb. 1992) (finding that flight is sufficient support
for an investigative stop only when combined with other indications of criminal activity).
117. State v. Tucker, 642 A.2d 401, 409 (N.J. 1994).
118. See, e.g., Platt v. State, 589 N.E.2d 222, 226 (Ind. 1992) (holding that flight alone is sufficient
to establish a reasonable suspicion).
119. St. Paul v. Vaughn, 237 N.W.2d 365, 369 (Minn. 1975).
120. State v. Hoaja, No. 17383, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2536, at *8 (June 4, 1999).
121. State v. Anderson, 454 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Wis. 1990).
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flight's evasive nature did support reasonable suspicion for a temporary
stop. Some states, such as North Dakota, have not decided cases directly
involving an individual's unprovoked flight, but have decided investigative stop cases, which indicate that they would likely require more than
flight alone for reasonable suspicion.1 22 Even the speed at which the
flight occurred has come into question; some courts have held that
quickening one's pace at the sight of the police does not justify a stop,
while others have held that high speed flight does.123
Several courts have required the presence of additional factors
along with flight to achieve the proper level of suspicion to conduct a
stop and frisk. 124 Some of these factors include: observed criminal
activity, particularized suspicious conduct (i.e. exchanging money and/or
a suspicious package), reports of nearby crimes, descriptions of recent
crime suspects, or a nearby vehicle matching a description of a vehicle
involved in recent crime. 1 25 For example, in Harris v. State,126 the
Georgia Court of Appeals examined the totality of the circumstances and
concluded that the defendant's flight in a known drug area created a
sufficient articulable suspicion for a stop and frisk.127
In sum, the Terry decision left the courts trying to determine what
factor or set of factors, known as the totality of the circumstances, would
establish reasonable suspicion for a lawful investigative stop. 128 Some
factors included the defendant's location, 12 9 the reliability of police
information,1 30 and the defendant's reaction to police. 13 1
122. See State v. Langseth, 492 N.W.2d 298, 299-302 (N.D. 1992). A police officer drove up
behind a van parked on a gravel road. Id. at 299. The van had its lights on and its engine running. Id.
The officer then flashed his warning lights, and the van slowly drove away. Id. The officer followed
with lights flashing, and the van stopped about 20 feet later. Id. The court found that this investigative
stop of a moving van, similar to an individual running away, alone did not constitute reasonable
suspicion. Id. at 302.
123. See LAFAVE, supra note 85, § 9.4(0, at 181 (quoting several cases that outline the courts'
different approaches to a fast walk versus running away from police in reasonable suspicion analysis).
124. See State v. Tucker, 642 A.2d 401, 407 (N.J. 1994) (requiring more than just flight to have
reasonable grounds for a stop); see also Harris v. State, 423 S.E.2d 723, 724 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)
(requiring flight and a high crime area).
125. See Tucker, 642 A.2d at 407 (listing examples of other facts needed in conjunction with
flight to justify an investigative stop).
126. 423 S.E.2d 723 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
127. Id. at 724.
128. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981) (describing the totality-of-thecircumstances approach).
129. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (finding that a defendant standing in a known
drug area in itself is not enough to justify a police investigative stop of the individual).
130. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (allowing a police officer relying on an
informant's tip to stop and frisk an individual, while rejecting the argument that an officer could only
justify a stop and frisk through his own personal observation).
131. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 622-23 (1991) (involving a group of youths,
including Hodari, who fled at the sight of oncoming police officers).

2001

CASE COMMENT

From this reasonable suspicion standard, three tiers of police-citizen
encounters developed based on differing degrees of suspicion: a hunch,
reasonable suspicion, and probable cause. 132 A hunch would only allow
an officer to question a person, and the individual had the right to refuse
to answer and could leave at anytime. 133 Since flight has invoked perceptions of guilt,13 4 the courts had to determine whether the MendenhallRoyer "free to leave" test 135 protected the defendant's flight in each par36
ticular case or whether the defendant's flight supported a lawful stop.1
III. ANALYSIS
Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the Court's opinion, which
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined.13 7 In a five-tofour decision, the Supreme Court declared that an individual's unprovoked flight at the sight of a police officer in a "high crime area"
created the reasonable and articulable suspicion needed for a lawful
Terry stop.1 38 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, concurred in part and dissented in part.139 Justice Stevens agreed
with the majority that the Court should not adopt a bright-line rule
regarding flight140 but disagreed with the Court's assessment of the
totality of the circumstances to convict Wardlow.141
A.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

42
Analyzing the four broad case law areas of the stop and frisk,1
Wardlow argued question number two-that the officers subjected him
to an unreasonable seizure. 14 3 The police seized Wardlow when they
stopped his flight and conducted a protective pat down of Wardlow
132. See People v. Shabaz, 378 N.W.2d 451, 457-58 (Mich. 1985) (dividing police-citizen
encounters into three tiers).
133. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983) (stating that an individual has no legal requirement to stop and answer police questions unless the officer has reasonable, objective grounds for
the stop); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding that a
citizen has the right to ignore his interrogator and walk away, unless the police officer has some
constitutional grounds to insist upon an encounter).
134. Cf. Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 510 (1896) (rejecting the common argument or
perception that flight after a crime is a presumption of guilt or a confession).
135. See supra Part II.C.
136. See supra notes 112-21 (listing cases where the lower courts are split on whether flight
alone, or flight coupled with certain circumstances, is enough to justify an investigative stop of a
fleeing individual).
137. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 (2000).
138. Id. at 124-25.
139. Id. at 126-40 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140. Id. at 126-36.
141. Id. at 137-40.
142. WHrrBREAD & SLOBoIN, supranote 61.
143. See Brief for Respondent at 6, Wardlow (No. 98-1036) (arguing that flight alone does not
support reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop).
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based upon the officer's past experience with weapons in the area.144
However, Wardlow did not appeal the lawfullness of the frisk. 145 As a
result, the sole issue revolved around whether the police had reasonable
146
grounds, based upon the particular circumstances, to seize Wardlow.
The Court reached its conclusion by applying the controlling
language in Terry and by looking at the record for reasonable suspicion
of a crime.147 It analyzed the two factors of reasonable suspicion, flight
and location, starting with the location of the investigative stop.14 8 The
Court based its finding, regarding the location of the stop, on the prece49
dent established in Brown v. Texas and Adams v. Williams.1
In Brown, the Court held that location alone was too ambiguous to
justify a stop. 150 The Court compared Wardlow to Brown because police
apprehended both Wardlow and Brown in areas known for heavy drug
trafficking.151 However, the Court distinguished Wardlow from Brown
because Wardlow took flight at the sight of the officers, while Brown was
walking along when officers stopped him. 152
The Court then referred to Williams where it considered the location
of the stop, a "high crime area," as a contextual consideration in a Terry
stop analysis. 153 Similar to Wardlow, the police also detained Williams in
a high crime area. 154 As a result, the Court concluded that a high crime
area alone does not create a reasonable suspicion of a crime; however,
location may be considered as one factor in establishing reasonable
suspicion.155
Next, the Court analyzed flight in three parts. 156 First, it examined
the evasive nature of flight. 157 Prior case law established that "nervous,
evasive behavior [wa]s a pertinent factor" in reasonable suspicion
analysis.15 8 Since no empirical studies dealing with the inferences that
144. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 n.2.
145. Id. at 124 n.2.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 123-26.
148. Id. at 124.
149. Id. (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (determining that a person's presence in
a particular area was not enough to conclude that the individual was engaged in criminal conduct);
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144 (1972) (finding a high crime area relevant in a Terry analysis)).
150. Brown, 443 U.S. at 52.
151. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (citing Brown, 443 U.S. at 52).
152. Id.
153. Id. (citing Williams, 407 U.S. at 144).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 124-26.
157. Id. at 124-25.
158. See id. at 124 (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989) (stating that agents
had reasonable suspicion in part because the defendant paid $2,100 in $20 bills for two airplane
tickets); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 3-4, 6 (1984) (stating that the defendant's urging of others to
"get out of here" and his running away from police were factors in finding reasonable suspicion);
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suspicious behavior causes existed, the Court reasoned that the law must
allow police officers to defer to "commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior." 159 The Court also explained that although
an individual's flight does not conclusively indicate criminal activity, it
does imply such activity.1 6 0 Consequently, the Court considered
"[h]eadlong flight [to be] . . . the consummate act of evasion" and

found that Officer Nolan had reasonable grounds to suspect Wardlow of
criminal activity.161
Second, the Court found its decision consistent with Florida v.
Royer because unprovoked flight is more than a "mere refusal to cooperate." 16 2 Royer established that individuals could refuse to cooperate
with police questioning and go on their way in the absence of reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity or probable cause for an arrest.1 6 3 The
Court distinguished Wardlow's situation from Royer's because Royer
did not take flight when police officers, who only had a hunch, approached him. 164 The Court reasoned that the right to go on one's way
only preserved the right to go about one's business and that flight was
the complete opposite of going about one's business. 165 The Court concluded that the Mendenhall-Royer "free to leave" test did not include
166
unprovoked flight.

Third, the Court found that Terry accepted the risk that the police
may stop innocent people who take flight for innocent reasons. 16 7 In
comparing Terry to Wardlow, the Court identified that in Terry the defendant's conduct in itself was ambiguous and susceptible to an innocent
explanation, as was Wardlow's flight. 168 But the Court also noted that
the defendant's behavior in Terry suggested criminal wrongdoing, which
supported an investigative stop.169 The Court rationalized that even under a probable cause standard the police could detain, and have detained,
some innocent people.170 Consequently, the Court's decision allowed
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975) (stating that driving erratically in an attempt
to avoid the border patrol is a factor in determining reasonable suspicion to stop a car)).
159. Id. at 124-25.
160. Id. at 125.
161. Id. at 124-25.
162. Id. at 125 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983)).
163. Royer, 460 U.S. at 498; see also supra Part II.C (explaining the Mendenhall-Royer "free to
leave" test).
164. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 (finding decision consistent with Royer, 460 U.S. at 493-94).
165. Id.
166. Id.; see also supra Part I.C.
167. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)).
168. See id. at 125 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-23 (stating that walking along a sidewalk, staring
into a store window, and standing on a street corner are independently subject to an innocent
explanation)).
169. See id. (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (finding that hovering around a street corner for an
extended period of time, staring into a business window twenty-four times, and routinely conversing
with others after each pass by the window did create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity)).
170. Id. at 126.
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police officers to combat crime by temporarily stopping individuals that
17 1
take unprovoked flight in a high crime area.
B.

JUSTICE STEVENS' CONCURRENCE

&

DISSENT

Justice Stevens concurred with the majority's refusal to establish a
per se rule with regard to flight. 172 Both parties had asked the Court to
create a bright-line rule to resolve whether flight alone sufficed to create
reasonable suspicion of a crime. 17 3
Although the underlying tone of the majority's opinion seemed to
favor the state's request, the Court's words in regard to flight-that "it is
not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of
such"1 74 -indicated the Court's unwillingness to adopt a per se rule.
Justice Stevens pointed out that from its establishment in Terry, an
investigative stop is an intrusive, intimidating act requiring a particular
degree of suspicion arising from certain non-criminal acts. 175 Analyzing
an investigative stop requires weighing the various factors to see if police
protection outweighs the individual's personal security.1 76
The question then became the degree of suspicion the Court should
attach to flight, a non-criminal act in and of itself.177 Justice Stevens
provided several examples of instances when people might take flight for
innocent reasons-to catch up with a friend, to meet the bus, to avoid a
bully or a bore, or to answer the call of nature. 178 He also noted that
innocent people sometimes flee out of fear of being apprehended as the
guilty party, being called as a witness, or being injured as a bystander.179
He concluded that the diversity and frequency of possible motivations
for flight and the many variables associated with the flight itself171. Id.
172. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioner at 7-36, Wardlow (No. 98-1036); Brief for Respondent at
6-31, Wardlow (No. 98-1036)). The state wanted a rule that authorized the detention of anyone who
flees "from a clearly identifiable police officer ... without provocation." Oral Argument on Behalf
of Petitioner at 6-7, Wardlow (No. 98-1036), available at 1999 WL 1034479. In the alternative, the
state requested a rule holding that flight in a high crime area would create reasonable suspicion. Brief
for Petitioner at 5, Wardlow (No. 98-1036). Wardlow, on the other hand, wanted a decision that never
made flight alone at the sight of a police officer grounds for an investigative stop. Brief for
Respondent at 6-31, Wardlow (No. 98-1036).
174. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.
175. Id. at 127-28 & n.1. Noncriminal acts, for example, include standing on a street comer,
strolling down the street, or looking through a store window in a business district. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 22-23 (1968). None of these acts are against the law; however, in certain contexts, or taken
together, these acts can create a reasonable suspicion of a crime. Id.
176. Terry, 392 U.S. at 26-27; see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967)
(identifying the need for a balancing test between necessary police work and personal invasion).
177. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
178. Id. at 128-29.
179. Id. at 131 & n.6.
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location, speed, direction, time of day-support the Court's denial to
80
accept a per se rule.1
Justice Stevens also considered the argument that some citizens, particularly minorities, view contact with police as hostile and dangerous. 181
He found that many African-Americans consider police harassment a
serious problem in their communities and believe that police indiscrimi18 2
nately and abusively conduct investigative stops of minorities.
Justice Stevens provided evidence to support African-Americans'
negative response toward police encounters. 18 3 For example, in an
informal survey of 100 young black and Hispanic men living in New
York City, eighty-one responded that they had been stopped and frisked,
with none of the stops resulting in an arrest. 184 Based upon these situations, Justice Stevens concluded that some people do consider "unprovoked flight" a normal response to a police presence.1 85
Since possible reactions to police contact vary widely, Justice Stevens continued to support the totality-of-the-circumstances approach,1 86
instead of adopting a per se rule. 18 7 He maintained that the courts
should "avoid categorical rules concerning a person's flight and the presumptions to be drawn therefrom" when making a decision involving
reasonable suspicion. 188
Although Justice Stevens supported the Court's use of the totalityof-the-circumstances approach, he disagreed with the majority's finding
of reasonable suspicion to justify this particular stop.1 89 He closely
analyzed the important facts of Wardlow's stop for their value in
establishing reasonable suspicion.190 First, he considered standing on a
street corner at 12:15 p.m. and holding a white bag as completely normal activity.191 Second, the police were traveling to an unidentified location and were expecting to see a large group of people; therefore, Justice
Stevens found that Wardlow's location and isolation did not match the
180. Id. at 129-30.
181. Id. at 132-33. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae of the ACLU for Respondent at 21-24,
Wardlow (No. 98-1036) (listing several examples of minority mistrust for police authority).
182. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132 n.7 (citing Jean Johnson, Americans' Views on Crime and Law
Enforcement: Survey Findings, 233 NAT'L INST. JUST. J. 13 (Sept. 1997) (finding that 43% of AfricanAmericans consider police brutality and harassment as a serious community problem)).
183. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 132-35 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184. Id. (citing Leslie Casimir et al., Minority Men: We Are Frisk Targets, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Mar. 26, 1999 at 34).
185. Id. at 132-33 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186. Supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
187. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 134 n.11.
188. Id. at 135; see also supra Part II.D (addressing the legal development of the perceptions of
flight).
189. Id. at 137.
190. Id. at 137-39.
191. See id. at 139 (finding nothing suspicious about the time of day or the white bag).
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police's profile. 192 Third, the record did not clearly show when or if
Wardlow recognized the police officers because the record failed to state
whether the police drove marked vehicles, whether officers besides Nolan
wore uniforms, or at what point in the procession Wardlow took flight.193
The only evidence that Wardlow's flight resulted from seeing the police
was Officer Nolan's statement that he "looked in our direction and
94
began fleeing."1
In summary, Justice Stevens agreed with the Court's rejection of a
bright-line rule regarding flight, and he also agreed that in specific
circumstances unprovoked flight may constitute the proper degree of suspicion for an investigative stop. 19 5 However, he found that the totalityof-the-circumstances approach required a more in depth or extensive
review of all the facts,196 while the Court seemed to focus only on two:
flight and location. 19 7 Consequently, Justice Stevens concluded that all
of the facts, in this specific case, did not support reasonable suspicion.19 8
IV. IMPACT
Overall, the Court's decision in Wardlow expanded Fourth Amendment precedent dealing with reasonable suspicion and the investigative
stop. The decision made unprovoked flight in a high crime area proper
grounds for an investigative stop and narrowed an individual's right to
leave when confronted with police questioning. 199 Since the Court utilized the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, 200 lower courts will still
have to examine each situation involving flight on a case-by-case basis to
determine reasonable suspicion and what actions constitute flight.201
On a more specific level, the decision granted police officers greater
authority to detain individuals without probable cause. 20 2 The Court
192. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens found no testi-

mony that any one besides Wardlow was on the street comer of 4035 West Van Buren. Id. at 138.
The lower court concluded from the record that the police were "simply driving by, on their way to
some unidentified location, when they noticed the defendant standing at 4035 West Van Buren." Id.
(quoting People v. Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d 65, 67 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)).
193. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
194. Id. at 137.
195. Id. at 136.
196. Id. at 137-39.
197. The Supreme Court 1999 Term Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REv. 179, 215-216 (2000).
198. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 139.
199. Id. at 124-25.
200. See id. (refusing to adopt a per se rule for flight and looking instead at the totality of the
circumstances).
201. In an Amicus Curiae Brief, the ACLU wondered what other actions, such as riding away on
a bicycle or entering a vehicle and driving away, would fall into the realm of flight if the Court
determined flight to be innately suspicious. Brief Amicus Curiae of the ACLU at 16-17, Wardlow (No.
98-1036).
202. See Jan Crawford Greenburg, Top Court: Cops Can Chase Those Who Flee, CHI. TRIa., Jan.
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applied a colorblind test that made no distinction between police investigative stops of majority or minority citizens. 20 3 This increase in police
authority should reach from the inner cities to the smaller cities and rural
20 4
areas across the United States.
A.

THE MACRO-EFFECTS

Both flight and a high crime area have gained weight as important
20 5
factors in determining whether reasonable suspicion of a crime exists.
Collectively, because the Court only focused on these two factors, the
presence of flight and a high crime area in a police-citizen encounter
now appear to justify an investigative stop, 20 6 making Illinois's request
for an alternative rule, that flight in a high crime area created reasonable
suspicion, 207 a reality by default. 20 8 As a result, the Court continued to
create a categorical list of factors that could serve as general guidelines
2 09
for justifying an investigative stop.
This decision also narrowed the "right to leave" test. 2 10 An indi-

vidual could still refuse to answer police questioning and turn and walk
away in the absence of reasonable suspicion, but the same individual
could not avoid the questioning altogether by taking flight; in essence,
2
the person could walk away, but not run away, from the police. 11
Moreover, the Court's refusal to adopt a per se or bright-line rule in
this matter preserved the totality-of-the-circumstances approach. 2 12 The
13, 2000, at NI (citing Tracey Maclin, a professor at Boston University School of Law, who found that
the Wardlow ruling is consistent with previous criminal law decisions of the Court, which have
generally given police broader power to stop and search people).
203. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 16, Wardlow (No. 98-1036) (arguing for a colorblind approach to applying the Fourth Amendment). See generally Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121-26 (making no
reference to Wardlow's race in the Court's opinion).
204. Infra Part IV.C.
205. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123-26; see also Watkins v. City of Southfield, 221 F.3d 883, 889 & n.3
(6th Cir. 2000) (stating that " Wardlow makes it clear that the 'events' that may be considered include
flight of the suspect"); United States v. Lewis, Nos. 98-6068/98-6348, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3308, at
*4-*5 (6th Cir. Feb. 29, 2000) (finding a heavy drug trafficking area, based upon the Wardlow decision, as an important factor in justifying an investigative stop of suspicious juveniles); United States v.
Gooden, No. 00-092 sec. J(5), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11369, at *7 (E.D. La. Aug. 1, 2000) (citing
Wardlow in referring to the "location where the encounter occurs... [as an] important element[ I in
assessing the totality of the circumstances").
206. The Supreme Court 1999 Term Leading Cases, supra note 197, at 215.
207. See Brief for Petitioner at 5-7, Wardlow (No. 98-1036) (finding the combined weight of
flight and location as sufficient for a reasonable suspicion of a criminal activity).
208. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-26. Although the Court did not hold that flight in a high crime
area always creates a reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop, it did place a significant amount of
emphasis on the flight and the area in upholding the conviction. Id. Lower courts could easily
interpret this to imply that flight in a high crime area supports reasonable suspicion.
209. See People v. Pigford, 17 P.3d 172, 175-76 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000) (considering flight a
significant factor in evaluating the totality of the circumstances).
210. See supra Part TI.C (explaining the development and effects of the "right to leave" test on
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
211. Greenburg, supra note 202, at N 1.
212. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 ("Headlong flight ... is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing ....
"). For an application of the applying the totality-of-the-circumstances approach to
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decision has left future courts with the same task of reviewing the circumstances surrounding an individual's flight before making a determination about the lawfulness of the stop. 2 13 The Court has not provided a
firm determination of whether unprovoked flight by itself, in all situations, could justify an investigative stop. 2 14 For example, if around noon
Wardlow had been standing without a bag in a residential neighborhood
not known for crime and had started running at the sight of a police
officer, the case may have turned out differently. Several courts have
interpreted the Wardlow decision to mean unprovoked flight by itself
justifies an investigative stop. 2 15 Other courts, however, have interpreted
Wardlow as requiring flight in conjunction with another factor to consti2
tute reasonable suspicion. 16
The Court authorized only the temporary detention of an individual
who flees at the sight of an officer in a high crime area without any
provocation 2 17 by the police. 2 18 Presumably, unprovoked flight is still
not sufficient to support probable cause for an arrest,2 19 a higher

2 20
standard than the reasonable suspicion needed for a Terry stop.
In contrast, provoked flight in certain circumstances may support
probable cause for an arrest.2 2 1 If an officer, acting on reasonable suspicion, gives an individual a command to stop, and the individual takes
flight, the individual's provoked flight alone, in certain jurisdictions,
could establish probable cause for an arrest. 222 Additionally, one court
has held that if an officer attempted an improper stop and the individual
determine whether a police officer had a proper basis for suspecting a detained person of criminal
activity, see United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).
213. See Joan Biskupic, Police May Stop, Frisk Those Who Flee at Sight of Officer; Court Says
Action Can Lead to "Reasonable Suspicion," WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2000, at AI0 (commenting that the
Wardlow decision did not break new ground).
214. See generally Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119.
215. E.g., United States v. McGrath, 89 F. Supp. 2d 569, 576 (E.D. Pa. 2000); State v. Jones, No.
99AP-704, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2495, at * 13 (June 13, 2000) (stating that "unprovoked flight may
fuel reasonable suspicion"); State v. Fencl, No. 24439-0-11, 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS 805, at *5 n.9
(May 26, 2000).
216. See United States v. Sanders, No. 99-1486, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 3794, at *4 (2d Cir. Mar.
9, 2000) (holding that an individual's flight upon noticing a police officer, in conjunction with a high
crime area, may constitute reasonable suspicion); see also People v. Delaware, 731 N.E.2d 904, 910
(I11.App. Ct. 2000) (finding that the patrolling officer's reliance on hearing sounds of gunshots and
subsequently seeing defendant take to unprovoked flight at the sight of the officer was enough to
justify a stop).
217. See Oral Argument on Behalf of Petitioner at 17, 20, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119
(2000) (No. 98-1036), available at 1999 WL 1034479 (defining for the Court that unprovoked flight
occurs when "a reasonable police officer can say it's the presence of the police officer that has
caused the flight" and nothing more, such as the officer's sirens or flashing lights).
218. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124-25.
219. In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1963), the Court found that the
ambiguity involved with flight prevents it from being sufficient to support probable cause.
220. See supra Part II.B (explaining the differences between the probable cause and reasonable
suspicion standards).
221. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-08-11 (1997) (making flight from a police officer, after
the officer has given an audio or visual signal to stop, a class B misdemeanor).
222. See e.g., id.
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took flight to avoid the officer (provoked flight), that subsequent flight
2 23
might turn an impermissible stop into a lawful one.
Further, the Court's decision left police officers, judges, and lawyers
with the problem of defining what actions constitute flight.224 Given the
constitutional right to go on one's way 22 5 and the current decision that
flight raises a high degree of suspicion, 226 courts will now have to decide
what individual actions will cross the line from a protected right to an
unprotected right. 22 7 For example, driving off in a car, hurrying into a
building, riding off on a bike, or jogging across the street at the sight of
22 8
the police may or may not constitute flight.
Wardlow also served as a guide to analyzing evasive behavior
2 29
because the Court labeled flight the "consummate act of evasion."
Several courts have used Wardlow as the standard test against which to
compare other evasive behavior to determine if the evasive behavior
230
created reasonable suspicion for temporary detainment.
B.

THE MICRO-EFFECTS

Wardlow has several potential ramifications for police officers, criminals, and ordinary citizens, both from a minority and majority perspective. First, the police officer now has broader discretion in dealing
with police-citizen encounters. 2 3 1 Flight coupled with any other suspicious factor-time of day, direction and speed of flight, location of
flight, etc.-may permit a police officer to stop an individual without
violating the individual's Fourth Amendment rights. 23 2 The effects of
223. See People v. Thomas, 734 N.E.2d 1015, 1021-22 (I11.App. Ct. 2000) (finding that a defendant's flight, induced by an officer's attempted unlawful stop, could turn an "otherwise ungrounded
suspicion into a suspicion that justifies the defendant's ultimate stop and detention").
224. LAFAVE, supra note 85, § 9.4, at 48 (Supp. 2001).
225. Supra Part II.C.
226. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (finding flight the "consummate act of evasion").
227. LAFAVE, supra.note 85, § 9.4, at 48 (Supp. 2001).
228. See generally id.; ACLU Brief at 16-17, Wardlow (No. 98-1036). The ACLU questioned
what other actions would fall into the category of flight or become equivalent to flight if the Court
created a bright-line rule. Id. If other actions, such as riding away on a bicycle, became grounds for
a Terry stop, the ACLU contended that the citizen's right to avoid police would be reduced to only the
privilege of "walking away." Id.
229. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (analyzing evasive behavior such as flight).
230. See United States v. Smith, No. 217 F.3d 746, 750 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding reasonable suspicion in part because the defendant tried to evade the police by turning around while driving a vehicle);
United States v. Dupree, 202 F.3d 1046, 1049 (8th Cir. 2000) (comparing the defendant's action of
dropping a small package over a bridge railing to headlong flight); see also United States v. Woodrum,
202 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2000) (determining from Wardlow that evasive behavior, which is at some level
ambiguous, is now a pertinent factor in finding reasonable suspicion); Copeland v. Florida, 756 So. 2d
180, 181 (Fla. Ct. App. 2000) (relying solely upon the Wardlow decision and finding defendant's
actions of backing away from police officers, putting himself between a woman and the police, and
keeping his hands concealed all provided a founded suspicion for stopping the defendant).
231. Greenburg, supra note 202.
232. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 752 A.2d 1147, 1155 (2000) (concluding that movement away
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this increase in police authority are three-fold: (1) police can react more
2 33
quickly to suspicious, evasive behavior, especially in the inner cities;
(2) motions to suppress evidence will continue to challenge this increase
in authority; 234 and (3) the detention of innocent individuals may increase. 235 Overall, the Wardlow decision should help reduce the amount
236
of crime in America's cities.
As for the accused, unprovoked flight may become an automatic
justification for a lawful investigative stop since the police now need little
else. 2 37 Arrested persons will have a difficult time suppressing evidence
on grounds of an impermissible stop when unprovoked flight is an applicable factor, 2 38 and innocent persons with valid reasons for flight may
legally fall victim to an investigative stop.239 "As a practical matter, a
post-Wardlow defendant must assume the burden of rebutting the
adverse inference arising from his flight, and must do so even if the surrounding circumstances are entirely consistent with his innocence." 240
However, since the Court applied the totality-of-the-circumstances approach and did not define flight, defense attorneys and defendants can
still continue to make motions to suppress evidence from investigative
stops, which police base on the defendant's evasive behavior. 24 1
Although the ruling provided an easier justification for investigating
evasive behavior, it also made it easier for the authorities to intrude into
the private security of each and every citizen. 242 Instead of stopping the
from officers plus the odor of marijuana created a reasonable suspicion).
233. See Brief of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. at 6-7, Wardlow (No. 981036) (stating that affirming the Illinois Supreme Court's ruling for Wardlow would greatly reduce the
effectiveness of the police in combating drug-related crimes in the inner cities); see also Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curie for Petitioner at 17, Wardlow (No. 98-1036) (supporting the immediate
seizure of individuals who take flight, otherwise, police officers would have no reasonable means of
further investigating the suspicious behavior).
234. See, e.g., United States v. Jordan, 232 F.3d 447, 450 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence). In Jordan, the police conducted an
investigative stop of the defendant after his flight in a high crime area. Id. at 448.
235. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 (recognizing that innocent people may flee from the police).
236. Cf. Brief of the National Association of Police Organizations, et al. at 2, Wardlow (No.
98-1036) (claiming that more crimes would go unsolved and that America would become a more
dangerous society if the Court overturned Wardlow's conviction).
237. See State v. Belcher, 725 N.E.2d 92, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (determining that flight from an
officer at three in the morning after changing direction to avoid contact constitutes reasonable
suspicion).
238. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (finding that headlong flight is "certainly" suggestive of
wrongdoing, which supports further investigation).
239. See id. at 125 (recognizing that innocent people may flee from the police).
240. Milton Hirsch & David 0. Markus, Fourth Amendment Forum: Illinois v. Wardlow: The
Wicked Flee When No Man Pursueth, 24 CHAMPION 38, 40 (June 2000).
241. See, e.g., Peters v. State, 531 S.E.2d 386 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (reversing a conviction due to
the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence collected from an investigative stop of an
individual who exited from a breeze-way known for drug sales and hurried to his vehicle at the sight
of the police officers).
242. See Greenburg, supra note 202, at NI (stating that some criminal defense lawyers and legal
observers question whether Wardlow has given the police too much authority to detain innocent
people).
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person, the police could simply follow and observe a fleeing individual
to see if the individual takes further action to justify an investigative stop
(i.e. discards a weapon or drugs along the route). 243 Each time the Court
has expanded the reasonable suspicion standard, it has permitted more
police interference with the public in areas that once required probable
cause. 2 44 The Court justified this increased interference by balancing it
with the need for more drastic police action to combat crime. 2 45 Consequently, the decision minimized the protection the Fourth Amendment
gives to the pre-Terry probable cause standard, which served as the
citizen's protector against unlawful searches and seizures. 2 46
Defense lawyers now have the task of preventing prosecutors from
using Wardlow as a stepping stone in creating a bright-line rule that
flight alone permits a search and seizure. 24 7 Unfortunately, the police
may subject an innocent individual to the humiliation, fear, and annoyance of an investigative stop and frisk248 simply based upon the individual's visual identification of the police and his or her subsequent rapid
movement away from them. 249
In contrast, the general public must understand the Court's balance
between intrusion upon individual rights and the necessity for effective
law enforcement. 250 In spite of the Wardlow decision, citizens still have
the right to refuse to answer police questioning and simply walk away, in
the absence of a reasonable suspicion for the stop. 2 51 Although society
243. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the ACLU at 26, Wardlow (No. 98-1036) (stating that police do
not need a reasonable suspicion just to pursue and observe a fleeing individual).
244. See infra Part II.
245. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126 (stating that the Fourth Amendment accepts the risk that
police may stop innocent people in connection with more drastic police action).
246. Terry established an exception to the Fourth Amendment probable cause standard--that
police could detain individuals with a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20-23 (1968). Therefore, each Court decision that upholds an officer's reasonable suspicion in
a particular set of circumstances increases this exception and decreases the protection of probable
cause. See id. at 36 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (finding that the Court's decision in Terry ignored the
existence of probable cause). Increasing the scope of the exception increases the number of citizen
activities that police can inquire into with a lesser degree of suspicion. See id. at 36 n.3 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (stating that allowing less than probable cause would leave citizens at the mercy of police
whims). Although increased police authority may help the police, the Court must also put limitations on
the reach of this authority. See id. at 38-39 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that changing the probable
cause requirement should be the deliberate choice of the people).
247. Hirsch & Markus, supra note 240, at 40.
248. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25.
249. See Hirsch & Markus, supra note 240, at 40 ("It will be all too easy for courts and
prosecutors to interpret Wardlow as meaning that flight alone permits search.").
250. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995) (referring to the
balancing test); see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999) (applying the balancing test
to Fourth Amendment analysis).
251. See Jacobs v. Village of Ottawa Hills, Ill F. Supp. 2d 904, 913-14 (N.D. Ohio. 2000)
(upholding the right of an individual to break off a voluntary police encounter and then walk away).
However, at least one judge questioned how many reasonable people would feel free to leave or
know that they have the right to leave when approached by a police officer and questioned about his
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has lost some of its protection against police searches and seizures, 2 52 it
has gained protection through increased police preventive measures
against crime. 2 53 Given the limited scope of the Court's decision-that
2 54
unprovoked flight in a high crime area created reasonable suspicion this trade-off appeared appropriate.
As for the minority citizen, the Court seemed to have taken the
25 5 This
approach that the Fourth Amendment applied a colorblind test.
decision did not justify minority flight from police officers due to
abusive investigative stops in the past, which would create racial profiling
in itself.2 56 Instead, the decision tended to reflect the argument that law-

abiding, minority citizens want adequate police protection and expect
police officers to conduct investigative stops of suspicious individuals in
their neighborhoods. 2 57 As a result, the police will continue to conduct
investigative stops of fleeing individuals in minority areas known for
high crime, 25 8 and the courts will have to determine to what extent the
race of an individual should affect their reasonable suspicion analysis of
flight.259

Unfortunately, even with the best training efforts and proper
supervision, instances of abusive police stops may still occur. 260 Citizens,
especially minorities, will continue to question the investigative stop practices and procedures used by police officers, often with good reason.2 6 1
For example, an article sharply criticizing the Supreme Court's decision
in Wardlow examined police racial discrimination throughout the
country.262 It concluded that Wardlow eroded the Fourth Amendment
or her activities. Overstreet v. State, 724 N.E.2d 661, 665 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (Robb, J., dissenting).
252. Supra note 246.
253. See generally Greenburg, supra note 202 (quoting Cook County State's Attorney Richard
Devine, that the city streets "will be safer because of this decision").
254. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 (2000).
255. See generally id. at 121-26 (making no reference to Wardlow's race in the Court's
opinion).
256. See Brief for Petitioner at 16, Wardlow (No. 98-1036) (emphasizing Terry's application of
an objective standard, which prevents varying racial standards and racial profiling). See generally
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121-26 (giving no reference to Wardlow's race in the Court's opinion, but
referring to an objective justification for making a stop).
257. Brief of Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc. at 8, Wardlow (No. 98-1036).
258. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (making no distinction between minority or nonminority areas in
enforcing the Court's opinion).
259. See The Supreme Court 1999 Term Leading Cases, supra note 197, at 210 (pointing out that
the Court in Wardlow did not address Wardlow's race in its analysis of reasonable suspicion).
260. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Rutherford Institute at 11, Wardlow (No. 98-1036) (citing
DAVID COLE, No E QuAL JUSTICE: R AcE AND C LASS INTHE AMERIcAN C RIMINAL J USTICE SYSTEM (1999)
(noting that a recent poll found that nearly 90% of African-Americans in New York thought the police
force often engaged in brutality against minorities and two-thirds said such brutality was widespread)).
261. See Police vs. The Community, NYPD Acquittalls in Diallo Slaying Send a Sobering Message, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 5, 2000, at 3J (Letter to the editor from Kirk Alan Jones) (referring to the shooting of Amadou Diallo, a West African immigrant, by New York City Policeman, and
noting that maybe Diallo should have fled). The police shot at Mr. Diallo forty-one times and hit him
ninteen times. Id.
262. See Adam B. Wolf, Note, The Adversity of Race and Place: Fourth Amendment
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protections for indigent minorities because minorities, who often consider flight from police reasonable, will feel the brunt of the more lenient
Terry stop standards. 26 3 Evolving from these types of arguments, the
Court can expect continued efforts to persuade the Court to reverse its
position regarding flight in a high crime area and to prevent a future
Supreme Court case from authorizing flight alone as sufficient for
264
reasonable suspicion.
Although the Court's ruling did not address remedies for abusive
stops of minorities by holding that police departments could detain
those fleeing in a high crime area, it did imply that preventing police
officers from investigating suspicious behavior was not the solution
to curtailing these abusive stops. 2 6 5 Instead, reporting the improper
police activities served as a more viable remedy. Minorities, faced with
negative police encounters, will have to consider equal protection claims,
section 1983 claims, 266 or administrative charges against particular police
departments 267 in order to rectify abusive police investigative stops. 2 68
C.

A

RURAL PERSPECTIVE

Although the Wardlow opinion involved flight in a high crime area
in a large city, 2 69 the decision also had implications for a small city or
rural setting. As an example, consider North Dakota's smaller cities and
Jurisprudencein Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 711 (2000) (providing
an argument that the Wardlow decision will continue to promote the inequalities and injustice involved
with investigative stops of minorities).
263. Id.
264. See Hirsch & Markus, supra note 240, at 40 (addressing life after Wardlow that prosecutors
can easily use flight as a powerful factor to determine reasonable suspicion and could attempt to
create a bright-light rule that flight alone or flight in a high crime area always equals reasonable
suspicion, unless defense lawyers continue to argue against the rule).
265. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126. "While all power is subject to abuse, the solution is not to
eliminate power, and place us at the mercy of the lawless; rather, the solution is for the Law to curb
the abuse." Brief of Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney at 21, Wardlow (No. 98-1036).
266. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (creating a tort applicable against state actors
who violate the federal constitution).
267. See Choi v. Gaston, 220 F.3d 1010, 1010 (9th Cir. 2000). Choi involved a lawsuit brought by
an Asian man against the Anaheim Police Department for an unreasonable stop and arrest.
268. See Oral Argument on Behalf of Petitioner at 14, Wardlow (No. 98-1036), available at 1999
WL 1034479 (answering Court's question about dealing with the problem that some individuals may
flee from police out of racial fear).
My response is that since Terry, when the Court discussed that issue, this Court has said
that under the Fourth Amendment we apply a colorblind test. We look at the balancing
outside of those issues [racial reasons for fleeing from police], and if those issues are
there, application of sanctions under the Fourth Amendment isn't going to resolve them.
They should be handled, as this Court has said, as recently as Whren, either by equal
protection claims or section 1983 claims or administrative charges within the particular
police department.
Id.
269. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121 (stating that the arrest of Wardlow took place on the streets of
Chicago, Illinois).
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agricultural environment.2 7 0 North Dakota codified the Terry standard
in 1969 by requiring the police to have a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity before conducting an investigative stop. 2 7 1 Wardlow
will impact the state in several ways.
First, even in smaller cities without police-designated high crime
areas for street narcotics trafficking, the police departments still have
locations that receive increased patrols because of higher criminal activity. 2 72 For example, in Fargo, North Dakota, the police often increase
their efforts in downtown commercial areas and in concentrated residence locations due to higher levels of crime in these areas. 273 Although
the Fargo Police Department did not have any police-defined "high
crime areas,"

27 4

the Wardlow decision added significant weight to these

areas of increased criminal activity as pertinent factors in making an
2 75
investigative stop.

Second, the Wardlow decision will probably not change any of the
Fargo Police Department's current practices in establishing reasonable
suspicion in regard to a fleeing individual. 276 Currently, the officer must
either observe other suspicious activity 27 7 or have some knowledge as to

why the person took flight before conducting an investigative stop. 2 78
The North Dakota State Attorney General's office reported that the
270. See Metropolitan Area Population Estimates for July 1,1999 and Population Change for
April 1, 1990 to July 1, 1999 Census Population Counts, United States Census Bureau Web Site, at
<http://www.census.gov> (last visited Apr. 8, 2001). Compare 1999 population estimates for Chicago,
Illinois (8,008,507) and Fargo-Moorhead, North Dakota-Minnesota (170,122) and Grand Forks-East
Grand Forks, North Dakota-Minnesota (95,461). Id.
271. See N.D. CENT.CODE § 29-29-21 (1991) (codifying case law that allowed a peace officer to
stop any person abroad in a public place whom he or she reasonably suspects is committing, has
committed, or is about to commit a crime).
272. Letter from Captain Ronald F. MacCarthy, Assistant to the Chief of Police, Grand Forks,
North Dakota, Police Department (July 5, 2000) (on file with author); Letter from Lt. Thorvald Dable,
Officer, Fargo, North Dakota, Police Department (July 18, 2000) (on file with author); E-mail from Lt.
Thorvald Dahle, Officer, Fargo, North Dakota, Police Department (Jan. 31, 2001, 10:22 CST) (on file
with author) (stating that the police departments focus on fights outside bars, noise complaints, and
traffic problems as some of the areas of higher criminal activity).
273. Letter from Lt. Thorvald Dahle, supra note 272.
274. Id.
275. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (finding that although location alone is not enough to justify an
investigative stop, officers should not ignore location as a relevant characteristic in establishing
reasonable suspicion).
276. See Letter from Lt. Thorvald Dahle, supra note 272 (noting that in his opinion it is relatively
easy for officers to establish reasonable suspicion). Other police departments probably will not
change any of their current practices. Steve Lash, Decision Clears Way for Chases by Police; High
Court Splits 5-4 in Stop-and-Frisk Case, HousTON CHRON., Jan. 13, 2000 at AI (quoting a local sheriff
as saying that the Wardlow decision "would not cause any policy changes or reviews at the Sheriff's
Department"); Greenburg, supra note 202 (quoting a police spokesman as saying that the Chicago
police have always considered all the circumstances when responding to a fleeing person and that the
Wardlow decision would not change their procedures).
277. See generally State v. Langseth, 492 N.W.2d 298, 300 (N.D. 1992) (stating that in acasual
encounter an officer "may learn" or observe something that leads to a reasonable suspicion).
278. Letter from Lt. Thorvald Dahle, supra note 272.
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state's law enforcement officials did not seem to have any "substantial
confusion or uncertainty" as to when these officers have reasonable
suspicion for a stop. 27 9 Some officers have had innocent kids take flight
at the sight of an officer for the excitement or to see if the police will
chase them. 2 80 However, this activity has happened very infrequently,
and the officer usually has some other suspicious behavior associated
with the flight to assess before giving chase. 28 1 As a result, the officers
will attempt to follow Wardlow's guidance in reacting to unprovoked
flight,282 but will still have to make good faith judgments on whether a
particular individual's flight is comparable to the Wardlow situation. 2 83
Third, the Wardlow decision will help officer's verbalize the basis
for their suspicions. 284 Officers can easily remember and refer to the
defendant's flight and increased criminal activity in a particular area as
important factors to justify their stops in a court of law. This will allow
officers to focus on other factors such as reports of nearby crimes,
suspect descriptions, and observed criminal activity needed in conjunction with the flight or location to support their investigative stops.
Finally, Wardlow works in conjunction with current North Dakota
statutes. 2 8 5 The North Dakota Century Code contains two fleeing
statutes, which, when combined, make it illegal for an individual to flee a
"pursuing" police officer, whether by foot, motor vehicle, or other
means of movement, after the officer has given an audio or visual signal
279. Letter from Robert P. Bennet, Assistant Attorney General, Bismarck, North Dakota (July 12,
2000) (on file with author). Although the officers may not have indicated any confusion in determining reasonable suspicion, the totality of the circumstances analysis does not provide any clear guidance on what constitutes reasonable suspicion-it only tells an officer or the court to look at the whole
picture. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 417, 417-18 (1981). The officer's level of "certainty" may
come from experience and the ability to compare current situations with previous circumstances that
supported reasonable suspicion. Id. at 418. However, it is unlikely that an officer will have this
"certainty" in every fact pattern that arises, especially when left with an analysis that is inherently
uncertain. See id. (stating reasonable suspicion analysis does not deal with hard certainties but with
probabilities).
280. Letter from Lt. Thorvald Dahle, supra note 272.
281. E-mail from Lt. Thorvald Dale, supra note 272.
282. See E-mail from Mike Wardzinski, Sergeant, Bismarck, North Dakota, Police Department
(Jan. 30, 2001, 9:16 CST) (on file with author) (stating that his department conducted training on
Wardlow and concluded that the fleeing of an individual from police coupled with one other aspect
that can be articulated by the officer is enough to establish reasonable suspicion).
283. Letter from Lt. Thorvald Dahle, supra note 272. Although the Fargo Police Department
does not have any policy regarding foot pursuits, the department expects officers to follow the decisions of the courts. Id. If an officer could not in good faith come up with any reason why a person
was fleeing, there is a good chance the officer would do nothing. E-mail from Lt. Thorvald Dahle,
supra note 272.
284. Letter from Captain Ronald F. MacCarthy, supra note 272 (stating that many times officers
are unable to verbalize the basis for their "hunches").
285. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-08-11 (1997) (covering an individual's provoked flight from
police but not unprovoked flight); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-10-71 (Supp. 1999) (entitled: fleeing or
attempting to elude a police officer-penalty).
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to stop. 286 Therefore, it is likely that the statutes apply only to an individual's "provoked" flight-a reaction to a police show of authority 28 7288
and not just to police presence.
The Wardlow decision, in contrast, covered the action of the fleeing
individual up to the point of time that an officer instigated the required
signal. 2 8 9 The defendant's flight in Wardlow was unprovoked, and it
helped create reasonable suspicion. 29 0 As a result, a North Dakota police
officer would have reasonable suspicion needed for a stop if the officer
observed an individual's flight in a high crime area. 29 1 The officer
could then flash his or her lights or give the individual a verbal command to stop running, and if the individual refused to stop, the officer
could then arrest the individual for the same flight that created the
reasonable suspicion. 292
The state has further complicated this flight analysis by statutorily
limiting the use of investigative stops. 2 9 3 When the state codified the
Terry standard, it limited the use of investigative stops to only certain
types of crimes.2 94 Other crimes appeared to require probable cause
before an officer could detain an individual. 295 This restriction has left
the state courts with trying to determine if the legislature intended these
restrictions to be all-inclusive, and if not, to what extent the courts can
go beyond them. 2 96 Consequently, without further clarification from
the state legislature or the state courts, a police officer, applying Wardlow, could lawfully stop a fleeing individual suspected of a felony, but
286. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-08-11 ("Any person, other than the driver of a motor vehicle
..who ... flees or attempts to elude, in any manner, a pursuing peace officer, when given a visual or
audible signal to stop, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor .. "); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-10-71 (making
it a class A misdemeanor for a motor vehicle operator to flee a pursuing police officer after the
officer has given an audio or visual signal to stop).
287. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-08-11, 39-10-71.
288. See Oral Argument on Behalf of Petitioner at 17, 20, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119
(2000) (No. 98-1036), available at 1999 WL 1034479 (stating that unprovoked flight occurs when "a
reasonable police officer can say it's the presence of the police officer that has caused the [flight]"
and nothing more, such as the officer's sirens or flashing lights).
289. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (noting that Wardlow's flight was unprovoked).
290. Id. at 124-25.
291. Id.
292. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-08-11, 39-10-71.
293. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21 (1991) (authorizing a temporary stop for any felony, misdemeanor relating to the possession of a concealed or dangerous weapon or weapons, burglary or
unlawful entry, and a violation of any provision relating to possession of marijuana or of narcotic,
hallucinogenic, depressant, or stimulant drugs).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. See City of Bismarck v. Uhden, 513 N.W.2d 373, 374-76 (N.D. 1994) (providing a motor
vehicle stop exception to the limiting language of section 29-29-21 of the North Dakota Century Code
and leaving open the question of what other types of crimes could also justify an investigative stop
exception); Interview with Thomas Lockney, Law Professor, University of North Dakota School of
Law, in Grand Forks, N.D. (Feb. 16, 2001).
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the officer could not stop the same fleeing individual suspected of a
misdemeanor unrelated to the possession of a concealed weapon. 297
V.

CONCLUSION

In Wardlow, the Supreme Court held that in certain circumstances
an individual's unprovoked flight upon seeing the police in a high crime
area meets the reasonable suspicion requirement for an investigative stop
of the type established in Terry v. Ohio.298 Preserving the totality-ofthe-circumstances approach, the Court declined to declare a bright-line
rule that flight alone would or would not always support reasonable suspicion. 29 9 Although the Court established no bright-line rule regarding
flight,30 0 its decision did put significant weight behind the factors of
flight and a high crime area in finding reasonable suspicion, which left
the police and the lower courts, in practice, leeway to create bright-line
rules regarding flight.
Keven Jay Kercher*

297. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-2 1.
298. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 121-26 (2000); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 4-23
(1968).
299. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121-26.
300. See id. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (highlighting the Court's refusal to endorse a
bright-line rule for flight).
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